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THE REVERSE STOCK SPLIT-THAT OTHER MEANS OF GOING
PRIVATE
PAUL H. DYKSTRA*

"Take some more tea," the March Hare said to
earnestly.
"I've had nothing yet," Alice replied in an offended
can't take more."
"You mean, you can't take less," said the Hatter;
easy to take more than nothing."
-Lewis

Alice very
tone, "so I
"it's very
Carroll,

Alice in Wonderland

During the surging bull market between 1967 and 1972, some 3,000
corporations filed registration statements with the Securities and Exchange
Commission offering their stock to the public for the first time.' The
investing public, beguiled by the prospect of seemingly unlimited growth in
the market value of the securities being offered, could scarcely get enough
of these so-called "hot issues." Yet that optimism quickly vanished.
Beginning in January 1973, the stock market experienced its steepest
decline since the Depression. Shareholders of newly public companies who
had purchased their shares at twenty to thirty times earnings or more have
seen this price/earnings ratio collapse, sometimes to as low as two or three.
The resulting "spread" 2 on shares traded in the over-the-counter market has
made sales of the shares possible only at a considerable additional economic
sacrifice to the selling shareholder (if, in fact, he can find any market for his
shares at all). Yet in spite of this collapse in the market prices of their
* Partner in firm of Gardner, Carton & Douglas: member of the Illinois Bar: LL.B.. Yale Law
School.
I. Former SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer. Jr.. "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate
Responsibility, BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 278. at D- I (Nov. 20, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Sommerl.
2. The "spread" is the difference between the "bid" price (i.e., what a dealer will buy a share
for) and the "asked" price (what he will sell it for). It is common for shares to carry, for example, a bid
price of $1 and an asked price of $1.50. which means that the dealer is adding a 50 percent markup.
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shares, the earnings and the book value per share of the issuing corporations
3
in most cases have been relatively unaffected.
This rather bizarre amalgam of acutely depressed stock prices (which
have only recently experienced a rebound) and continued healthy corporate
earnings has led to the phenomenon which may become every bit as popular
4
as going public was five years ago-the "going private" transaction.
While there is no precise definition of "going private," companies which
do so almost always have as a prime objective the elimination of sufficient
shareholders (to a number below 300) so as to terminate their registration
under § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and their concomitant
obligation under that Act to furnish periodic reports to shareholders and the
SEC. 5
METHODS OF GOING PRIVATE

Nearly all attempts to go private utilize variations of one or more of a
limited number of basic techniques. These include (in probable order of
3.
4.

See Bus. WEEK, Dec. 21, 1974, at 103.
See generally Sommer, supra note 1; Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975)

[hereinafter cited as Going Private]; Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and

Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brudney & Chirelstein]; Kessler,
Elimination of Minority Interests by Cash Merger: Two Recent Cases. 30 Bus. LAW. 699 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Kessler]; F.H. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS"
OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS: EXPULSION
OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, § 5.32 (1975) [hereinafter cited as O'NEAL]; LEE & RILANDER,
THE GOING PRIVATE TRANSACTION (1975) [hereinafter cited as LEE & RILANDER]; KIRSHBERG & ELLIS,
INTRODUCTION TO GOING PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
(1975) [hereinafter cited as KIRSHBERG & ELLIS]; Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No
Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 987 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Borden]; Brudney, A Note on "Going Private,"
61 U. VA. L. REV. 1019 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Brudney]; Note, "Going Private": Establishing

Federal Standards for Forced Elimination of Public Investors, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 638 [hereinafter cited as
Establishing Federal Standards]; Editorial, The Public Be Damned?, Barron's, Jan. 5. 1976, at 7.
5. Pursuant to § 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970)
[hereinafter referred to in this article as the "1934 Act"], most issuers having an outstanding equity
security held of record by 500 or more persons are required to register the security with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and thereby become subject to the periodic reporting requirements imposed by §§
13 and 15(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1970). These periodic reports include the
issuer's annual report on Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1975), quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, 17
C.F.R. § 249.308a (1975), monthly reports (if a reportable event has occurred during the preceding

month) on Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1975) and reports of beneficial ownership on Form 3, 17
C.F.R. § 249.103 (1975) and Form 4, 17 C.F.R. § 249.104 (1975) for officers, directors and 10 percent
shareholders. In addition, the issuer's proxy statements must contain the information required by

Schedule 14A under Regulation 14A under the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1975). An issuer
may deregister an equity security by filing a certification with the commission that there are fewer than 300
holders of record of the security. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(g)(4), 78o(d) (1970); see note 60 infra.
Definitions of going private include such a causing of a class of equity securities to be delisted from
a national securities exchange (see Going Private, supra note 4, at 904 n.7) or the causing of a class of
equity securities which is authorized to be quoted in an inter-dealer quotation system of a registered
national securities exchange to cease to be so authorized. See SEC Proposed Rule 13e-3A(a)(5)(ii), SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5567, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11231, SEC Public Utility
Holding Co. Act Release No. 18805, SEC Trust Indenture Act Release No. 380, and SEC Investment
Co. Act Release No. 8665 (Feb. 6, 1975), [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
80,104; and text following note 40 infra.
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frequency): (1) A cash tender offer by the issuer, its management or an
affiliated entity; (2) a merger or consolidation of the issuer with, or the sale
of its assets to, another corporation controlled by management of the issuer;
(3) an exchange offer (almost always involving a debt security) by the
6
issuer, its management or an affiliated entity; and (4) a reverse stock split.
Much has been written lately about the first three methods listed
above-their advantages and disadvantages to the corporation, its principal
shareholders and its minority shareholders.' There has been a surprising lack
of comment and only one reported judicial decision, however, on that
"other" means of going private-the reverse stock split, which in many
instances may be the issuer's most certain and economical method of
achieving its objective. 8
EXPLANATION OF THE REVERSE STOCK SPLIT

As the term implies, the reverse stock split is the conventional stock
split in reverse-instead of a company amending its charter so as to have
more shares authorized and outstanding, the charter is amended so as to
reduce dramatically the authorized and outstanding shares. A more direct
and descriptive term might be "stock consolidation."
As an illustration, let us assume that a corporation's charter authorizes
the issuance of 1,000,000 shares of common stock, with a par value of $.01
per share, all of which are currently outstanding. Further assume that these
shares are held by 750 shareholders, of whom only 15 hold 1,000 shares or
more. The corporation then amends its charter so as to authorize the
issuance of only 1,000 shares of common stock, with a par value of $10.00
per share. As a result, each share existing before the amendment is
reclassified into 1/1,000 of a share following the amendment; every
shareholder who held fewer than 1,000 old shares now will hold less than
one full share, or a fractional share. Finally, in lieu of issuing fractional
shares to these holders, the corporation, as it is permitted to do under most
state statutes, 9 pays them cash for their fractional holdings. The result of the
6. See KIRSHBERG & ELLIS, supra note 4, at 6.
7. See note 4 supra.
8. See Lawson, Reverse Stock Splits: The Fiduciary's Obligations Under State Law, 63 CAL. L.
REV. 1226 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Lawson]. The following commentators make passing references to
the reverse stock split: Sommer, supra note 1, at D-3; Going Private, supra note 4, at 911, 919; Kessler,
supra note 4, at 708 n.32, 709 n.37; O'NEAL, supra note 4, at § 5.32; KIRSHBERG & ELLIS, supra note 4,
at 6, 9; Borden, supra note 4, at 999-1000; Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 4, at 1021; Establishing
Federal Standards, supra note 4, at 643. The only reported decision adjudicating the propriety of a
reverse stock split is Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 III. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974),
appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975); see text following note 67 infra.
9. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 155 (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.22 (1975). For
convenience, references to state corporation statutes throughout this article will include only Delaware
and Illinois.
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amendment, then, is a reduction of the number of the corporation's
shareholders from 750 to 15-it has gone private.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF GOING PRIVATE

For smaller publicly-held companies with only a few hundred thousand
shares outstanding and with shares trading at $1 or less, the annual costs of
complying with SEC reporting requirements can be very significant. The
fees of law firms and accounting firms which must be retained to assist in
the assembling of information for and the drafting and review of these
reports often aggregate $25,000 per year and up for these services alone. 01
This means that if the corporation has, for example, 500,000 shares of stock
outstanding which trade at a price of $1 per share, its annual legal and
accounting fees relating to SEC compliance would equal five percent of the
market price per share. Substantial, if less measurable, additional costs
inure to the corporation in the form of salaries paid to internal personnel who
have responsibility for SEC compliance. Moreover, the greater the number
of shareholders, particularly those with small holdings, the higher are the
corporation's postage, printing, and transfer agent costs. As a result of these
factors, the annual cost to small publicly-held corporations of complying
with SEC requirements can be a very high proportion of the trading price of
their outstanding stock.
Going private can provide significant internal benefits to a corporation.
Instead of leaving its key employees with stock options which have gone
"underwater" because of a precipitous drop in the public market price of its
stock, corporations which go private can peg the option price to the stock's
book value, which often exhibits a steady advance from year to year,
irrespective of market trends and prices. Likewise, a corporation desiring to
issue its stock in a merger or acquisition will find going private to its
advantage, in that it need not be hindered in the transaction by what it
regards as an unreasonably low public market price for its shares but instead
can agree upon a more realistic valuation through private negotiation."
Going private in some cases can be justified as simply a good corporate
investment, particularly when it results in a positive effect on earnings per
10. Accounting fees in particular are bound to increase. Effective December 25, 1975, the SEC
began requiring issuers registered under § 12 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970), to provide
selected quarterly data in their annual financial statements and additional data in Form 1O-Q, 17 C.F.R. §
249.308a (1975). SEC Accounting Series Release No. 177, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5611, SECSecurities Exchange Act Release No. 11641, SEC Public Utility Holding Co. Act Release No. 19162
(Sept. 10, 1975), 5 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
72,199. These amendments will require a greater
involvement by the issuer's auditors during the course of the year. The SEC has conceded that the
additional costs occasioned by the amendments will not be "trivial."
II. See Going Private, supra note 4, at 908-09. In addition, companies listed on a national
securities exchange which go private may save several thousand dollars in annual listing fees upon
delisting. Id. at 904 n.7.
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share (by reducing the number of shares outstanding) or when it causes an
increase in the book value per share (when the repurchase is effected at a
price less than existing book value). While it is true that there will no longer
be a meaningful public market for the shares following the going private
transaction, the corporation can still benefit from an upward revaluation of
its own shares by negotiating acquisitions or issuing stock options on more
2
attractive terms, as described above.'
For economic reasons alone, then, "going private" makes sense for
many companies. Ancillary benefits include a reduction in the possibility of
litigation based on allegedly misleading or incomplete SEC reports and
freedom from subsequent takeover attempts by outsiders.' 3 Another, less
defensible, advantage is the elimination of the quarrelsome or litigious
shareholder.
The going private transaction often benefits the shareholders themselves, particularly those owning shares of issuers whose stock has a small
"float" and thus a relatively illiquid trading market. These holders normally
may sell only at a disproportionately large "spread" and thus incur, in
effect, a penalty for their sale.' 4 The going private transaction offers these
shareholders the opportunity to realize some cash (albeit substantially less
than they originally paid out) for their shares at a time when no other
reasonable selling opportunity is available.
The long-term economic benefits which a corporation hopes to derive
from going private are not without their short-term costs. No matter which
method is selected, the purchase price of reacquiring shares held by the
public is substantial, often amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars
even for very small publicly-held issuers. ' Legal and accounting fees
incurred in drafting the going private materials to be furnished to
shareholders are often many times larger than the annual legal and
accounting fees incurred in complying with SEC requirements. Printing and
postage costs are likewise sizeable. In most going private transactions,
substantial amounts must be paid to the investment banking firm serving as
dealer-manager, to the proxy solicitation firm assisting in obtaining a
favorable shareholder response, to the bank serving as depositary for the
shares in the case of tender or exchange offers, and to the independent
appraisal firms providing the corporation with an estimate of the stock's fair
value. Additional fees and expenses may be incurred in complying with the
requirements of state Blue Sky laws. Advertisements in financial publica12.
13.
14.
15.

See
See
See
See

id. at 906-09.
generally LEE & RILANDER, supra note 4, at 2-3.
note 2 supra.
Going Private, supra note 4. at 907-08.
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tions, sometimes essential to the success of a tender offer, for example, may
be costly. Finally, the mailing to shareholders of going private materials
these days is often much like issuing an invitation to meet in court. The
corporation should not be surprised if a lawsuit, or at least the threat of one,
is forthcoming from a disgruntled shareholder or opportunistic counsel. 16
The disadvantages of a going private transaction to a minority
shareholder can be substantial. Whether the transaction is structured so that
his participation is outwardly "voluntary" (e.g., a tender offer) or
"mandatory" (e.g., a merger), the effect of the transaction upon the small
shareholder is essentially the same-inherently coercive. If the shareholder
accepts a tender offer, for instance, under present conditions he must usually
do so at a price much less than he paid for his shares. If he rejects the offer,
he is faced with the real possibility that there will be no meaningful trading
market for his, shares after the completion of the tender offer. 17 He can hope
only that the corporation will follow the tender offer with a traditional
"mop-up" technique (e.g., a merger or a reverse stock split) to acquire the
remaining minority shares, possibly at a price less than the tender offer
price.' 8 In the case of a merger, while in most states he may exercise his
dissenter's right of appraisal to challenge the price per share offered to him
by the corporation,' 9 it is usually uneconomical for the holder of only a few
hundred shares to do so. 20
Thus, as a practical matter, when a corporation goes private, its
minority shareholders are being forcibly divested of their shares for a price
which may be only a fraction of what they paid for them. Consequently,
they may realize unfavorable tax consequences at a time not of their own
16. See, e.g., Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3743 (May 14, 1976); Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976);
Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975); Bryan v.
Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); Grimes v. Donaldson,
Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,722 (N.D. Fla. July
15, 1974); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp:, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,219 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1975), rev'd, 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W.
3751 (U.S. June 8, 1976); People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., Civil No. 40678-1975 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., June
12, 1975); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (Ch. 1975).
17. See Sommer, supra note 1, at D-3. Former Commissioner Sommer colorfully suggests that a
shareholder in this situation is confronted by "a market reduced to glacial activity and the liquidity of the
Mojave Desert."
18. See generally Going Private, supra note 4, at 910-11.
19. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 253(d), 262 (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.70 (1975).
20. Referring to this right of appraisal, former Commissioner Sommer observes: "Anyone who
has been through one of these so-called 'appraisal proceedings' knows their difficulties. First, they take
forever, and during that time typically the dissatisfied shareholder is locked in with an asset he can't sell
and he receives no dividends. Furthermore, these actions do not take that form most dreaded by
management, the class action; each shareholder must assert his own claim." Sommer, supra note I, at
D-3. See also Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1297 n.4 (2d Cir. 1976) (concurring
opinion). See generally Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77
HARv. L. REV. 1189, 1201 (1964).
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choosing, or they may have to release stock certificates pledged for a loan
when it is disadvantageous for them to do so. The shareholders who are
taken out are also deprived of the protections against insider trading and of
the additional disclosure required of corporations registered under § 12 of
the 1934 Act. 21 Finally, such shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to
participate in a business that management thinks is on the upswing, since
this is presumably why the corporation has elected to go private in the first
place.
SPECIAL ADVANTAGES OF THE REVERSE STOCK SPLIT

All going private transactions, then, present certain distinct disadvantages to corporations and their shareholders. If management decides
nonetheless to proceed with the going private transaction, it would be well
advised to think of the reverse stock split first rather than after the other
more popular methods have been rejected. The reason is that, on balance,
the reverse stock split is the most economical and direct method of achieving
private status for many corporations.
One of the principal advantages of the reverse split over other methods
of going private is the certainty and finality lacking in the tender offer or the
exchange offer. Assuming that it has the requisite number of votes to assure
approval of the charter amendment, management, by fixing the ratio of new
shares to old shares at the inception of the reverse split, knows in advance
what the number of shareholders, the number of shares outstanding and the
proportion of ownership will be after the charter amendment. Management
can thus be certain that the corporation will have fewer than 300
stockholders and accordingly will no longer have to comply with SEC
reporting requirements. 22 It knows in advance that, unlike a tender offer
situation, it will not have to resurrect the transaction at a later time or follow
it up with another "mop-up" transaction to eliminate a lingering minority.
Likewise, it can gauge with far greater accuracy what the transaction will
cost.
A second advantage to the use of a reverse split is that it is generally a
less expensive means of going private than the other methods. Virtually the
only document employed is a proxy statement. 23 This contrasts with a
21. See note 5 supra and Going Private, supra note 4, at 907.
22. See note 5 supra.
23. In the event that management already has enough votes to pass the amendment so that a
solicitation of the votes of the minority shareholders is unnecessary (see note 32 infra), it must still
furnish such shareholders with an information statement pursuant to Regulation C under § 14(c) of the
1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2 (1975). The disclosure required to be included in the information
statement by Schedule C to Regulation 14C, 17 C.F.R. § 14c-4 (1975) is similar to that required in the
proxy statement by Schedule A to Regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 14a-5 (1975). Seenote 5 supraandtext
following note 51 infra. 'his article will employ the term "proxy statement" so as to include the term
"information statement" where the context requires.
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merger, which involves the furnishing to each shareholder of a proxy
statement, a lengthy SEC prospectus containing detailed information
concerning each of the parties to the merger, and a sometimes prolix merger
agreement. 2 Legal, accounting and printing costs incurred in drafting these
documents are sizeable, and delays in awaiting their review by the SEC may
be lengthy.25 Further, unlike a merger, dissenters' statutory rights of
appraisal generally do not apply to a reverse stock split. While the price paid
per fractional share is still subject to challenge in an ordinary lawsuit
brought by a disappointed shareholder, it is unlikely that a minority
shareholder would be willing to incur the expense of such suit.
The reverse split is usually cheaper than a tender or exchange offer for
the reason that the entity making the offer generally must offer a price per
share substantially in excess of the current market price in order to enhance
the prospects Qf success. Such a sizeable "sweetener" is seldom necessary
to the success of a reverse split because it is essentially an involuntary
transaction with respect to the minority holders. Further, a tender offer or
exchange offer is sometimes preceded by the corporation's repurchase of its
shares in open market transactions, thereby driving up the market price of
the stock and increasing the costs of the offer. These preliminary purchases
are absent in a reverse split.
The reverse split does not require the corporation, in most cases, to pay
the sizeable fees of a dealer-manager, a proxy soliciting firm, or a
depositary, all of which are usually essential to the success of a tender offer.
Newspaper advertisements are obviously not necessary. Because only a
charter amendment is involved, unlike in a tender offer, state Blue Sky laws
generally do not require that the reverse split transaction be effected through
26
a registered broker-dealer.
At least for the time being, the reverse split offers a third advantage
because it probably gives the corporation greater insulation from litigation
24. Securities to be offered to shareholders in a proposed merger or consolidation are generally
required to be registered under the Securities Act of 1933 by the terms of Rule 145, 17 C.F.R. § 230.145
(1975). Accordingly, the issuer must prepare and file with the SEC a registration statement, usually on
Form S-14, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 7271, containing detailed information concerning the transaction,
Rule 145(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a)(1) (1975) specifically excludes a reverse stock split from such
requirements.
25. Because a registration statement is involved, the materials cannot be mailed in final form to
shareholders until the registration statement is declared effective by the SEC. This process, which may
involve the filing of a series of amendments to the registration statement to conform to "comments" of the
SEC staff, can take weeks or even several months. In a situation in which only a proxy statement is
involved, such as a reverse split, the issuer only is required to file preliminary copies of the proxy materials
with the SEC at least 10 days prior to mailing out definitive copies thereof to the shareholders. Rule 14a-6 to
Regulation A under the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 14a-6 (1975). However, see text following note 43 infra.
26. The requirement imposed by Blue Sky laws of many states that certain transactions be effected
through a broker-dealer registered in those states 'is
often an important factor in deciding to retain an
investment banking firm as a dealer-manager in a tender or exchange offer. But see text preceding note 66
infra.

REVERSE STOCK SPLITS

than does a merger or a tender or exchange offer. Such as it is, all of the
precedent for a reverse split is favorable-the only reported case adjudicating its propriety upheld the transaction for the reason that the corporation
complied with statutory procedures. 27 The case law with respect to tender
offers, on the other hand, is developing rapidly and uncertainly. It is
difficult, for example, to be sure what does and what does not constitute a
tender offer.2 8 It may be considerably more demanding upon counsel to draft
tender or exchange offer materials so as not to omit or misstate a material
fact with respect to the offeror's future plans for the issuer following the
offer, its financing of the offer, the fairness of the price, significant
developments, and the like. 29 Mergers and tender offers have often been
struck down on the basis of inherent unfairness or lack of legitimate business
purpose.30 The very fact that all small shareholders are removed as a result
of a reverse split makes future litigation less likely than in a tender offer, for
example, where non-tendering shareholders sometimes linger on and then
sue the corporation."' Finally, the fact that the charter amendment has been
approved by the requisite statutory vote might in some instances be
32
persuasive to a court evaluating the propriety of the reverse split.
.27. Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59111. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974), appeal dismissed,
422 U.S. 1002 (1975); but see note 30 infra and text at notes 87 and 88 infra.
28. See generally Einhorn, Takeover Developments, 6 REV. OF SEC. REG. 815, 815-16 (1973).
29. See Haft, Disclosure in Cash Tender Offers, 8 REV. OF SEC. REG. 975 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Haft] and text following note 52 infra: cf. Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp.,[1975-1976
Transfer Binderl CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,342 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1975).
30. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844
(1974) (proposed merger with affiliated company struck down because of lack of legitimate business
purpose); People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., Civil No. 40678-1975 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., June 12, 1975)
(temporary injunction obtained by Attorney General of New York on ground that the proposed going
private merger is a "fraudulent practice").
A complaint is cognizable under Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1975), when it alleges that the
majority breached its fiduciary duty to the minority by effecttng a short-form merger "without any
justifiable business purpose". Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1291 (2d Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3743 (U.S. May 14, 1976). In Green, the court of appeals managed to find a cause
of action under Rule lOb-5 even while acknowledging that the majority had fully complied with state law
and had not misrepresented or failed to disclose a material fact with respect to the short-form merger. The
sweeping language of the majority opinion, unless later qualified or overruled, seems applicable to reverse
stock splits and thus may make them similarly vulnerable to Rule lOb-5 actions:
When controlling shareholders of a publicly held corporation use corporate funds to force
extinction of the minority shareholders' interest for the sole purpose of feeding the pocketbooks
of the controlling shareholders, such conduct goes beyond mere negligent mismanagement and is
properly cognizable as "an act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud* * * .- The majority has abused its equitable powers by exercising them for the
"aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion or detriment of the
cestuis. " Pepper v. Litton, [308 U.S. at 311] ....
See also Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d
722, 736 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc).
533 F.2d at 1290.
31. E.g., Petersen v. Federated Dev. Co., 387 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Marsh v. Armada
Corp., 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976).
32. However, shareholder ratification is meaningful only when a substantial majority of disinterested shareholders approves the transaction; the inadequacy of ratification by those in control has been
discussed elsewhere at length. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 4, at 299-300; Borden, Going
Private, 8 REV. OF SEC. REG. 833, 839-40 (1975).
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The reverse split, together with the merger, have one further important
practical advantage over a tender or exchange offer. Many corporations
have several hundred or even several thousand shareholders whose
whereabouts are unknown but who must still be considered record holders
by the corporation. As a result, even if the tender or exchange offer is an
enormous success, the corporation cannot represent to the SEC that it has
fewer than 300 record holders without first eliminating these unknown
holders from its stock lists. 33 Such an elimination cannot be effected without
first resolving difficult problems of escheat or reversion. 34 Since almost all
unknown shareholders hold small numbers of shares, these holders would
automatically be eliminated following a reverse split or merger, and the
going private transaction would be complete shortly after filing the proper
3
certification with the SEC. 1
SPECIAL DISADVANTAGES OF THE REVERSE SPLIT

The reverse split is not without significant drawbacks, which in some
instances will foreclose its use altogether. One of the principal disadvantages is that a reverse split requires an amendment of the corporate charter.
Obviously it will not work unless the corporation can obtain the number of
votes necessary to amend the charter. While management of a publicly-held
corporation seldom has difficulty in procuring the requisite shareholder vote
for a proposal which it supports, a reverse split is likely to engender more
opposition than other proposals because it strikes at the very heart of share
33. Even though the whereabouts of such shareholders are unknown, the corporation itself still
carries them as the holders of record on its stock lists and indicates the shares so held as outstanding on its
financial statements and reports. Rule 12g5-1 under the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1 (1975), which
defines the term "held of record," makes no exception for unreachable holders.
34. Absent a successful going private transaction, there are probably only two ways to remove
unknown shareholders from the corporation's stock lists. One is for the corporation to take steps to have the
shares escheat to the state (see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1198 (1974)). The gist of this procedure is
that the passage of time without action of some sort by the record holder raises the presumption that the
stock has been abandoned, and then title to the stock may be transferred to the state by judicial or
administrative proceedings. The state which is entitled to this stock is governed by the law of escheat of the
state listed as the last known address of the shareholder on the company's records; in the absence of such a
law, the law of escheat of the state of incorporation normally governs. SeeTexas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S.
674 (1965). Accordingly, this procedure requires a survey of the law of escheat for every state in which the
corporation has an unknown shareholder and can turn into an administrative nightmare. See Pennsylvania
v. New York, 407 U.S. 206 (1972), and Note, Escheat of Intangibles: The Conflicts Problems Remain, 34
U. Prr. L. REV. 671 (1973). As a result, the employment of escheat as a method for removing large
numbers of unknown holders of record is almost hopelessly unwieldy.
Another such means of removal is for the corporation to amend its charter or by-laws so as to have the
shares of unknown shareholders revert to the corporation. See Note, Disposition of Unclaimed Dividends
and Shares-Distributions from Interstate Business Associations, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1354 (1964).
However, courts which have considered this procedure have almost universally condemned it. See, e.g.,
State v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 36 N.J. 577, 178 A.2d 329 (1962) and Maguire v. Hibernia Sav. &
Loan Soc'y, 23 Cal. 2d 719, 146 P.2d 673 (1944).
35. See note 4 supra and notes 59 and 60 infra.
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ownership. It is a request to minority shareholders to vote in favor of
terminating their participation in the enterprise.
Moreover, if the corporation has a class of preferred stock outstanding,
a strong case can be made that the holders of the preferred stock are entitled
to vote separately as a class on the proposed amendment. Most state statutes
require such a separate class vote if the rights or preferences of the holders
36
of that class would be adversely affected by the proposed amendment.
Since the result of a reverse split may be that the corporation distributes
large amounts of cash to the holders of its common stock in exchange for
their fractional shares while the preferred shareholders get nothing, it may
be persuasively argued that the preferences of the preferred stock are indeed
being adversely affected so that a class vote is required. 37 In that event, it
may be much more difficult for the corporation to obtain the requisite
approval of the holders of the preferred stock, particularly if that stock is
closely held by persons unaffiliated with management. 38 This situation
contrasts sharply, of course, with a tender offer, for which no shareholder
vote is required and which may fulfill corporate objectives even if all
shareholders do not tender.
Perhaps the most significant drawback to the reverse split, at least for
the time being, is that, since a charter amendment is involved, proxy
materials must be prepared and, in the case of companies whose securities
are registered under the 1934 Act, filed with the SEC.3 9 Normally it is a
perfunctory matter for a corporation to file its proxy materials with the SEC,
which typically renders advisory comments as to the information which the
materials should contain within ten days after filing. These "suggestions"
are generally complied with by the issuer and the proxy materials are then
mailed out to security holders a short time later.
On February 6, 1975, the SEC issued for comment proposed Rules
13e-3A and 13e-3B under the 1934 Act-the controversial "going private
rules."40 Rule 13e-3A, if adopted, would require an extensive disclosures
on the part of an issuer or affiliated persons seeking to go private, including
audited financial statements for the issuer's two most recent fiscal years,
unaudited "stub" financial statements, pro forma financial statements
showing the effect of the proposed transaction on the issuer, a discussion of
the purpose of the transaction and any further actions planned by
36. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(c)(2) (1974) and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.54(h) (1975).
37. See Bay Newf. Co. v. Wilson & Co., 20 Del. Ch. 270, 28 A. 157 (1942).
38. If the preferred stock is publicly held, of course, it, too, should be subject to the reverse split. See
text preceding note 5 supra and note 58 infra.
39. See note 25 supra.
40. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11231, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 80,104.
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management, a general description of federal tax consequences to the issuer
and its shareholders, and an appraisal from two qualified independent
persons as to the adequacy of the consideration to be paid to the
shareholders, with the proviso that the consideration may be no lower than
that which is jointly recommended by the two appraisers. It is, of course,
true that counsel for any issuer which is planning a reverse split would
doubtless insist that much of the foregoing information be included in the
issuer's proxy statement on the ground that it is material to the shareholder's
ability to cast his vote intelligently. 4 ' Counsel might well conclude,
however, that some of this disclosure, such as the extensive financial data or
the recommendations of the two independent appraisers, is not a condition
precedent to an informed decision.
As it happens, what counsel may think should be included in the going
private materials, the fact that the going private rules are merely proposed
rules on which no hearings have been held, and the fact that the comments
on these proposals have been so critical that it is unlikely that they will be
adopted in their present form 42 appear to be of only moderate concern to the
staff of the SEC. In possible violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 43 some members of the staff on occasion have been "enforcing"
proposed Rule 13e-3A as if it were currently in effect. They will not
"clear" a proxy statement relating to a planned reverse split unless all data
called for by proposed Rule 13e-3A are furnished. 44
The upshot of all this is that the reverse split, which should be a
relatively simple, direct and economical procedure for an issuer, in some
instances cannot be effected without incurring the sizeable costs resulting
from the drafting and printing of what amounts to a very substantial
disclosure document and the substantial fees charged by the independent
appraisal firms. The alternatives for the issuer who is unwilling to furnish all
of the information called for by the proposed rule are unhappy ones. The
issuer can either ignore the SEC "suggestions" for more disclosure, thereby
running the risk that the SEC will seek to enjoin the solicitation of proxies or
the meeting at which the reverse split is to be voted upon, 45 or it can avoid
41.

See generally Haft, supra note 29.

42. SeeBNA SEC. REG. &L. REP. No. 318, atA-I (Sept. 10, 1975). Manyof such comment letters,
such as that of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the American Bar Association, have
questioned not only the wisdom of the proposed rules but whether the SEC has the statutory authority to
impose substantive requirements of fairness. Id. at A-2.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)(1970); see, e.g., Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6thCir. 1973).
44. The staff is not similarly "enforcing" proposed Rule 13e-3B, SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 11231, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,104, at 85,093, which
would prohibit an issuer from going private unless it "'has a valid business purpose for doing so."
45. See the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). If the SEC did attempt to enjoin the solicitation of
proxies or the meeting (or to void it afterwards), it is most unlikely that it would rely upon the terms of
proposed Rule 13e-3A. Instead it would probably assert a violation of existing Rule 14a-9. 17 C.F.R. §
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such a confrontation with the SEC by abandoning current plans for the
reverse split altogether which appears to be the much wiser course. Such
issuers instead should consider a tender offer which, although subject to the
same disclosure requirements as a reverse split, involves no materials
required to be filed with the SEC, which therefore cannot "enforce" its
proposed rule.
MECHANICS OF THE REVERSE SPLIT

As already explained,' the essence of a reverse stock split is the
amendment of the corporate charter so as to consolidate the number of
shares which are authorized and outstanding. The chief goal of management
generally is to reduce the number of its record holders to below 300 so that
the corporation can terminate its obligation to comply with SEC reporting
requirements. 47 An ancillary objective, which might be best left unstated,
may be to eliminate certain especially obstreperous shareholders. Accordingly, management must fix the ratio of old shares to new shares necessary
to achieve its goals. 48 For the sake of simplicity, the denominator of this
9
ratio is typically divisible by 100 or 1,000.4
Management also must establish the price to be paid by the corporation
per fractional share. Prudence in many instances would suggest that this
amount be at least the higher of the corporation's book value per share and
the most recent asked price of the shares, so as to help establish
management's good faith in the event of subsequent litigation attacking the
price to be paid. In any event, the price to be paid should be on the generous
side. Thereupon, as in any charter amendment, the board of directors must
adopt resolutions setting forth the proposed amendments, declaring their
advisability, and either calling a special meeting of shareholders or directing
that the proposed amendments be considered at the next annual meeting.50
240.14a-9 (1975), its "elastic clause," which prohibits the use of a proxy statement which "is false or
misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements therein not false or misleading ....
" Even in the absence of an injunction, any
issuer which intentionally fails to comply with SEC suggestions may find its future filings beset by lengthy
delays and uncommon scrutiny.
46. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
47. See text preceding note 5 supra.
48. While it is possible for this ratio to be fixed so that only one shareholder remains after the split,
management (particularly if it holds only a bare majority of the outstanding shares) thereby runs the risk
that a court will overturn the transaction as a sham since the majority may have greater difficulty in
establishing a legitimate business purpose. See text preceding note 54 infra and text following note 88
infra.
49. For convenience, the par value per share is normally increased by the same proportion as that by
which the number of shares is reduced. See text at note 65 infra.
50. A Delaware corporation may amend its certificate of incorporation "[t]o increase or decrease its
authorized capital stock or to reclassify the same, by changing the number, par value [etc.] . . . of the
shares .... ." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(a)(3) (1974). It may "purchase, redeem, receive, take or
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Management, together with its counsel, should allow several weeks for
the drafting of the proxy materials, which include the notice of meeting,
proxy statement, proxy, and the text of the proposed amendments. Counsel
should consult with the SEC branch chief of the issuer in advance to
ascertain whether that particular branch is applying the proposed going
private rules. 5 If so and if management decides to proceed with the reverse
split nonetheless, the drafting of the proxy statement at least may be
undertaken with a fairly precise idea of what information must be included.
In addition, two appraisal firms should be retained at once. If the SEC
branch does not apply the proposed rules (or they have been rescinded),
counsel may conveniently use these rules as a guide for disclosure, so as to
include in the proxy statement as much of such information as he deems
material .52
Counsel should pay special attention to Item 13 of Schedule A to
Regulation 14A under the 1934 Act. 53 This item, which must be answered if
an outstanding class of securities is to be modified, requires a description of
the outstanding securities and the effect of the proposed amendment
thereon, a statement of the reasons for the proposed amendment, and "such
other information as may be appropriate in the particular case to disclose
adequately the nature and effect of the proposed action." While the extent
of the "other information" is ultimately a matter for the issuer and its
counsel to decide upon, in almost all cases it would include disclosure as to
the number of record holders which would exist after the adoption of the
proposed charter amendment, a statement that the issuer would no longer be
registered under the 1934 Act and accordingly would cease filing the
periodic reports required thereunder, a description of the number of shares
and the proportion of ownership to be held by management and other
otherwise acquire. . . its own shares . ...
Id. § 160(a). A Delaware corporation "may, but shall not be
required to, issue fractions of a share. If it does not issue fractions of a share, it shall . . . pay in cash the
fair value of fractions of a share as of the time when those entitled to receive such fractions are determined
. . . .

Id. § 155.

An Illinois corporation may amend its articles of incorporation so as to '[ilncrease or decrease the
aggregate number of shares, or shares of any class, which the corporation has authority to issue" (ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 32, § 157.52-5 (1975)); "[iincrease or decrease the par value of the authorized shares of any
class having a par value...
(id. § 157.52-6); and "'[elxchange, classify, reclassify, or cancel all or any
part of its shares, whether issued or unissued." (Id. § 157.52-7). Further, "[a) corporation shall have
power to purchase, take, receive, or otherwise acquire. . . its own shares. . . [and it] may purchase or
otherwise acquire its own shares for the purpose of. . . [elliminating fractional shares." (Id. § 157.6(a)).
In addition, "[a] corporation may, but shall not be obliged to, issue acertificate for a fractional share, and,
by action of its board of directors, may in lieu thereof, pay cash equal to the value of said fractional share
...
. "(d. § 157.22).
5 I. See text following note 43 infra.
52. Tender offer or going private merger materials involving other corporations, which generally
may be obtained without charge from investment banking firms or financial printers, are similarly helpful
reference tools.
53. 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 26,871, at 20,136.
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affiliated persons, a discussion of the method of arriving at the price to be
paid per fractional share (including information as to recent market prices of
the shares and as to the current book value per share), and a statement to the
effect that there would likely be no meaningful trading market in the issuer's
securities following the adoption of the amendment. Management should
also discuss what changes, if any, it intends to make in the company's
operations following the adoption of the amendment.
Perhaps most important, the proxy statement should disclose the reason
for the proposed reverse split-the corporation's avowed business purpose.
Where the purpose, at least in part, is to effect corporate savings, the
estimated amount of these savings, together with the costs of the proposed
transaction, should be quantified to the extent possible.5 4 Likewise, pursuant
to Item 15 of Schedule A, 55 the corporation should include in its proxy
statement the financial statements required by Form 10 under the 1934 Act,
although the SEC staff may permit the omission of certain of these
statements if they "are not necessary for the exercise of prudent judgment in
regard to any matter to be acted upon.' '56 In this connection, a pre-filing
57
conference with the branch chief can be fruitful.
Following review and comment by the SEC staff, the proxy materials
as revised are mailed to the shareholders, the meeting is held, and the
proposed amendment voted upon. If adopted, the amendment is filed with
the secretary of state in the state of incorporation and becomes effective
upon such filing. 58 Management should then furnish a letter to each record
holder of fractional shares requesting a surrender of his share certificate for
the specified amount of cash and a letter to each record holder of full shares
offering to exchange a new certificate for his old one. Irrespective of when
the holders of fractional shares surrender their certificates, they cease to be
54. Cf. Kessler, supra note 4, at 709; see text following note 88 infra. For an enumeration of
possible additional legitimate business purposes, see e.g., Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. Profit
Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., Civil No. 10409-1975 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Feb. II, 1976);
Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976); and text following note 10 supra.
55.
56.
57.
appendix
58.

3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
26,871, at 20,139.
Item 15(c) to Schedule 14A under Regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1975).
Although not essential, it is common to include the full text of the proposed amendments as an
to the proxy statement.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 103, 242(c)(3) (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.56, 157.57

(1975). In Illinois the articles of amendment must also be filed with the recorder of deeds of the county in
which the registered office of the corporation is located. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.56 (1975). Filings
must also be made in most states in which the corporation is qualified as a foreign corporation.
In Delaware, a simple majority of those entitled to vote thereon is required for the adoption of the
amendment. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(c)(1) (1974). In Illinois, it must be approved by a two-thirds
majority. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.53(c) (1975). For requirements as to a separate class vote, see text
following note 36 supra. In some instances, it may be advisable to structure the transaction so that the
preferred stock is subject to the reverse split as well.
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record holders upon the filing of the amendment with the secretary of state.5 9
As a result, the issuer may file immediately thereafter its certification to the
SEC that it has fewer than 300 record shareholders. Pursuant to § 12(g)(4) of
the 1934 Act, the corporation's registration and its concomitant obligation to
6
file reports under the 1934 Act normally terminate ninety days thereafter. 0
POTENTIAL PITFALLS

If the corporation has outstanding a class of securities convertible into
the shares which are to be consolidated or options or warrants for these
shares, counsel should be certain that the terms of conversion or exercise are
adjusted to reflect the reverse split. Furthermore, in the event that securities
of this kind are outstanding, the corporation is deemed by the SEC to be
engaged in a continuing distribution of the underlying common stock and,
pursuant to Rule lOb-6 under the 1934 Act, may not effect a "purchase" of
its common stock without an exemption. 6' The payment of cash for
fractional shares following a reverse split is a "purchase" within the
prohibitions of Rule lOb-6. 62 Accordingly, prior to paying cash for its
fractional shares, an issuer with outstanding convertible securities, options
or warrants should obtain an exemption from Rule lOb-6. This exemption
should be readily forthcoming, in view of the fact that revised proposed
Rule 13e-2 would exempt from the definition of "purchase" the payment of
cash for "any fractional interest in a security. "63
59. Provided, of course, that the amendment or the resolutions of the board are drafted so as to
provide specifically that all persons entitled to less than a full share shall cease to be shareholders of the
corporation upon the effectiveness of the amendment. For a discussion of the accounting treatment of the
reverse split and the filing of reports reflecting a reduction in capital, see note 65 infra and the preceding
text.
60. See note 5 supra. The SEC staff requires the corporation to continue to file reports during this
ninety-day waiting period, but normally does not require the filing of reports pertaining to this period after
its expiration. If the issuer has filed a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933 containing an
undertaking to file the periodic reports required by the 1934 Act, it must also file a certification of
deregistration pursuant to Rule 15d-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-6 (1976). This certification may be filed only if
the issuer has fewer than 300 holders of record of the security to be deregistered at the beginning of that
fiscal year and becomes effective immediately upon filing. Effective August 2. 1976, the SEC adopted
Form 12g/15d-6, which is to be used for deregistration under either § 12(g)(4) or.§ 15(d)(6). SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 12551 (June 17, 1976) [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 80,603.
61. Paragraph (b) of Rule lOb-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 Ob-6(b) (1975), providesthat "[t]he distribution
of a security (I) which is immediately exchangeable for or convertible into another security, or (2) which
entitles the holder thereof immediately to acquire another security, shall be deemed to include a distribution
of such other security within the meaning of this section." An exemption from the prohibitions of Rule
IOb-6 may be requested by the issuer pursuant to paragraph (f) thereunder. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-6(f)
(1975).
62. The 1934 Act defines "purchase" to "include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise
acquire." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1970). Proposed Rule 13e-3A(a)(4) would define "purchase" to
include "any purchase of fractional shares in connection with a reverse split." Proposed SEC Rule
13e-3A(a)(4). 11974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80.104.
63. SEC proposed Rule 13e-2, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10539 (Dec. 6, 1973),
[1973 Transfer Binderl CCH SEC. REG. L. REP. 79,600 would exempt from the prohibitions of Rule
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The payment of cash for fractional shares is probably a "purchase"
under state law as well. Most state statutes provide that a corporation may
not purchase its own shares at a time when its capital is impaired (or would
be impaired as a consequence of the purchase). 6 As a result of the reverse
split, the corporation's stated capital is reduced by an amount equal to the
number of "old" shares being repurchased multiplied by the par value
thereof, and its earned surplus (i.e., its retained earnings) is reduced by the
remaining amount of cash which it must pay out for the fractional shares.65
This latter amount may not exceed the earned surplus.
Finally, counsel should carefully review the securities laws of the states
in which the corporation has shareholders, particularly the provisions
relating to the registration of broker-dealers, to be certain that the
corporation is not deemed to be a broker-dealer (and thus required to register
as such) by virtue of purchasing its own fractional shares. It should be noted
that at least one state, Wisconsin, has adopted its own going private rules
which specifically apply to a reverse split. 66
Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.

It is perhaps surprising that the reverse stock split has resulted in only
67
one reported judicial decision, Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.
Since the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled in that case that a reverse stock
1Ob-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1975) (pursuant to the proposed new paragraph (f) to Rule IOb-6, included
in the SEC Release) any "purchase" effected in accordance with the terms of proposed Rule 13e-2. By the
terms of proposed paragraph (g) of Rule 10b-6, the limitations of Rule 13e-2 would not apply to the
"purchase of any fractional interest in a security, . . . if the fractional interest (i) resulted from a...
reverse stock split . . . and (ii) is purchased pursuant to arrangements among the persons entitled to such
fractional interests not so combined." Since the SEC staff, in granting requests for exemption from Rule
lOb-6, also treats proposed Rule 13e-2 as if it were effective (see text following note 42 supra), the
obtaining of the exemption in the context of a reverse split should be almost perfunctory. Cf. Rule 152A
under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.152a (1975).
In addition, corporate indentures and loan agreements sometimes prohibit the purchase by the
corporation without the consent of the holders of debt securities or the lender. If so required, these consents
must be obtained prior to proceeding with the reverse split.
64. DEL. CODE ANN. ut. 8, § 160(a) (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.61 (1975).
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 244 (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.60 (1975); see note 49
supra.
In Delaware, the corporation's capital may not be reduced until a certificate to that effect has been
filed pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 244(c) and 103 (1974). The reacquired shares may be retired by
resolution of the directors, pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 243(a) (1974). Such shares are then
considered authorized and unissued, unless the reissuance thereof is prohibited by the corporate charter, in
which case a certificate cancelling the shares must be filed pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 243(b) and
103 (1974). In Illinois, the reduction of capital is effected by filing a report under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §
157.58a (1975). This report should indicate whether the shares have been cancelled.
66. Wisc. ADM. CODE, SEC § 5.05 (1975 Supp.).
67. 59 I11.2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974). The law firm of which the author is a member served as
special counsel to Chicago Title and Trust Company and Lincoln National Corporation in the formulation
of the reverse stock split and represented the defendants in the Teschner litigation.
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split is proper under Illinois law but carefully limited its holding to the
specific facts presented, it is important reading for counsel to companies
which are contemplating a reverse split.
In August 1969, Lincoln National Corporation made an exchange offer
to the shareholders of Chicago Title and Trust Company, an Illinois
corporation, whereby Lincoln offered one share of its preferred stock for
each share of Chicago Title common stock, This exchange offer enjoyed an
overwhelming acceptance-a total of 2,225,244 shares of common stock of
Chicago Title (99.3 percent of those outstanding) were tendered to Lincoln,
thereby leaving only about 95 shareholders, holding a total of 8,077 shares
of Chicago Title, who had not tendered. 68 By most yardsticks, then, Chicago
Title had already gone private. Following the exchange offer, its shares
were delisted from the New York Stock Exchange and it ceased to be a
reporting company under the 1934 Act. After this delisting, a few shares of
Chicago Title common stock were traded in a very limited over-the-counter
market at prices ranging from $40 to $45 per share. 69
In December 1970, Lincoln sent the remaining shareholders of Chicago
Title a letter offering to purchase their shares at $69.50 per share, which was
the approximate current market price of the Lincoln preferred stock issued in
the 1969 exchange offer. Fifty of the remaining shareholders, owning 6,187
shares of Chicago Title, accepted this cash offer, thereby leaving Lincoln
with 2,231,431 shares (99.9 percent) of Chicago Title and approximately 45
other shareholders with a total of only 1,890 shares. 70
In order to simplify its corporate activities and reduce expenses, 71
Lincoln decided to employ a reverse split to eliminate the tiny minority.
Lincoln opted against causing Chicago Title to be merged into a whollyowned subsidiary on the ground that this method would be more expensive
and time-consuming than a reverse split, particularly because of problems
involving the merger of a trust company .72 It was unable to utilize a
short-form merger because this procedure did not become available in
7
Illinois until July 1972. 1
68. Id. at 454, 322 N.E.2d at 55.
69. Brief for Appellee at 10, Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 I11.2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54
(1974).
70. 59 111.2d at 454, 322 N.E.2d at 55.
71. Id. at 459, 322 N.E.2d at 58; cf. Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,722 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 1974).
72. Interview by author with one of Lincoln National Corporation's special counsel, in Chicago,
Illinois, December 22, 1975.
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.66(a) (1975). This statute permits a subsidiary, at least 99 percent
of the outstanding shares of each class of which are owned by the parent, to be merged into the parent by
action of the respective boards of directors. No vote of the shareholders is required but each minority
shareholder must be notified. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974), which permits such a procedure
with respect to a 90 percent owned subsidiary. See text preceding note 83 infra.
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The proposed amendment adopted by Chicago Title's directors
provided for the reclassification of its 2,233,321 shares of common stock,
with a par value of $6 2/3 per share, into 3,722 shares having a par value of
$4,000 per share. This was a ratio of one new share for each 600 old shares.
The directors further provided that $69.50 (the same amount paid in the
tender offer of December 1970) was to be paid for each 1/600 of new share
following the adoption of the amendment by the shareholders. 74 Although no
independent appraisals were obtained, the price was clearly generous. 75 At a
special meeting of the shareholders held in February 1971 to consider the
proposed amendment, a total of 2,231,431 votes were cast in its favor and
76
63 votes were cast against it, all by the plaintiff, Barbara Teschner.
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff requested the Circuit Court of Cook
County to restore her as a shareholder of Chicago Title on the grounds that
the action taken at the shareholders' meeting was invalid as a breach of
Lincoln's fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders of Chicago Title, as a
deprivation of her property without due process of law, as a violation of her
right to equal protection of the laws, and as an impairment of her contractual
rights. 77 The plaintiff's argument, then, was framed primarily on rather lofty
constitutional theories-she alleged, but did not drive home, the point that
the majority had violated its fiduciary duty owed to her under the common
law by "squeezing out" her interest in the corporation. 78 She did not attack
the legitimacy of Chicago Title's business purpose for the reverse split nor
did the Illinois Supreme Court question it. 79 Moreover, Mrs. Teschner did
not claim that the price paid for her fractional shares was unfairly low, that
Chicago Title had failed to comply with the statutory requirements of the
Illinois Business Corporation Act, or that it had acted fraudulently. If she
had raised any of these challenges-particularly as to the validity of the
business purpose for the transaction or the price paid per share-she would
have succeeded at least in shifting the burden to Chicago Title and thereby
might have enjoyed a stronger case. 8°
As it was, however, since the court was permitted to presume the
sufficiency of Chicago Title's business purpose and the price which it paid,
it had little trouble with the plaintiff's constitutional arguments. It observed
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objective,
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See note 72 supra.
59 111.2d at 454, 322 N.E.2d at 55.
Id.
"Perhaps plaintiff lost the case by failing to show that defendant Lincoln had a squeeze-out
but the court certainly could have inferred that objective from the facts that were established."
supra note 4, at 363. See generally Lawson, note 8 supra.
59 I11.2d at 459, 322 N.E.2d at 58.
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); see Kessler, supra note 4, at 704-10; Bryan v.
Blevins, 490 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1974); cf. Lawson, supra note 8, at 1240.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

that the law was well beyond the point where the unanimous consent of a
corporation's shareholders was needed to effect fundamental corporate
changes. 8 Instead, the opinion noted, state legislatures had authorized the
making of such changes by majority vote, so as to "provide needed
flexibility and to remove what was in effect a power of veto held by a
dissenting minority." 82 These statutes had been overwhelmingly upheld
against constitutional attack. As an illustration, the court referred to the
existence of merger statutes which enable the majority to terminate the
interests of the minority by paying them the cash value of their stock. It
inferred the approval by the Illinois legislature of this policy by citing the
recent adoption of the Illinois short-form merger statute, which provides for
the elimination of a minority of one percent or less without a shareholder
vote .81 While the court acknowledged that some cases and commentators
have suggested that a majority may not "freeze out" a minority in the
absence of an underlying valid business purpose, it made no analysis of
these arguments, for the obvious reason that the plaintiff had not attacked
Chicago Title's business purpose. 84
Instead, the court upheld the reverse split on the familiar ground that a
corporate charter is a contract between the corporation and its shareholders
into which must be imputed prevailing statutory provisions. Since Chicago
Title had complied with both its charter and the statutory requirements, it
85
had not, in the court's view, impaired the contractual rights of the plaintiff.
In addition to the fact that Mrs. Teschner did not challenge Chicago
Title's business purpose, its good faith, or the price paid per share, the court
must have been impressed by the fact that Lincoln owned 99.9 percent of the
outstanding shares of Chicago Title. Even if the plaintiff had convinced the
court that Illinois law did not specifically authorize the removal of minority
shareholders by means of a reverse split and the reverse split had been
invalidated, Lincoln had an alternative. At substantial additional expense,
Lincoln presumably could have accomplished the same result through a
86
short-form merger, a specific legislative endorsement of minority removal.
In other words, it is possible that the court viewed the complaint as little
more than a strike suit, particularly since the decision was carefully
circumscribed by the admonition that "[wie do not say that under all
81. 59 Ill. 2d at 456, 322 N.E.2d at 56; see also Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283,
1305, 1306 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), petitionfor cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3743 (U.S. May 14, 1976).
82. 59 Ill. 2d at 456, 322 N.E.2d at 56.
83. Id. See note 73 supra; butseeGreenv. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.),petition
for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3743 (May 14, 1976).
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circumstances minority shareholders will be denied relief when the majority
has proceeded under the provisions of the Act, but we do not7 consider that
8
the plaintiff has shown grounds for the relief she seeks."
Teschner, then, is only a limited judicial endorsement of the reverse
stock split as applied to a factual situation unusually favorable to the
defendants. Even so, the decision has been criticized as "highly questionable" by a leading, if dogmatic, commentator on the removal of minority
interests.8 8 A more realistic appraisal of Teschner is that it represents a
pragmatic judicial acceptance of the principle that minority shareholders do
not, and should not, possess what amounts to an inalienable right to remain
as participants in the corporate enterprise. It recognizes instead the existence
of a corporate right, circumscribed only by considerations of fundamental
fairness, to terminate minority participation where appropriate for the
efficient functioning of the business. In Teschner that fairness was so
evident as to be unquestioned-the price paid to the minority was
abundantly adequate, there was no attempt to defraud or to overreach by the
majority, and there was a plainly sensible business purpose. Such an
89
analysis lends itself well to any going private transaction.
CONCLUSION

The reverse stock split can be the most direct and economical means for
a corporation to return to private status. It should not, however, be viewed
as a clever short-cut to be employed when the more popular techniques of
going private are foreclosed to the corporation because of equitable or
statutory roadblocks. Only if utilized with discretion and formulated with
care will it survive judicial scrutiny.
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